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The United States' current practice of extraordinary
renditions' has attracted both the attention and criticism of many
within the domestic and international communities. The criticism
covers virtually every aspect of that program, from the legality of
renditions under international and domestic law, to the treatment
of those individuals subjected to rendition. Recent attention has
focused on what some claim as the Bush administration's efforts
to avoid any legal accountability for alleged constitutional and
t Associate Professor of Law, New England School of Law. I would like to thank
my research assistant Michael Kreppel for his fine work.
The term "extraordinary renditions" refers to a program that began in the early
1990s and continues to this day, whereby the Central Intelligence Agency, together with
other U.S. government agencies, transfer foreign nationals suspected of involvement in
terrorism to detention and interrogation in countries where - in the U.S. Government's
view - federal and international legal safeguards do not apply. Suspects are detained and
interrogated either by U.S. personnel at U.S.-run detention facilities outside U.S.
sovereign territory or, alternatively, are handed over to the custody of foreign agents for
interrogation.
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statutory violations committed while the United States rendered
and either directly or indirectly subjected the victims of the
renditions to torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading
treatment.2
Indeed, after their release, some of those who claim to have
been subject to extraordinary rendition have filed lawsuits in the
U.S. federal courts claiming constitutional and statutory violations
committed by both government agencies and government
contractors involved in these renditions. 3  In cases where the
United States has been named as a party to the lawsuits, and in
other cases where the United States has intervened, the
government has sought to dismiss the lawsuits on the ground that
any litigation of these issues would require the disclosure of
classified and other sensitive information.4  According to the
government, if this protected information and the existence or non-
existence of rendition programs were disclosed, or even
acknowledged, there is a reasonable danger that such disclosure
would harm national security interests.5 Based on what has come
to be known as the state secrets privilege, the government has
successfully prevented a number of cases by plaintiffs who claim
to be victims of extraordinary rendition and torture from going
forward.6
In this paper I will discuss the use of the state secrets privilege
in the context of civil suits brought against the United States
government and private contractors working for the federal
government by alleged victims of extraordinary rendition. The
paper focuses on how best to achieve meaningful oversight of the
executive's actions and allow the courts to fulfill their important
role of providing individuals the opportunity to have their rights
vindicated and protected, while at the same time securing
legitimate state secrets. I hope that this focus on extraordinary
2 See, e.g., Barry Siegel, Op-Ed., State-secret Overreach, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-
siegel16sep16,0,4846280.story.
3 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007).
4 See, e.g., id. at 312.
5 See Brief of Appellee at 35, El-Masri v. United States, (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 2006)
No. 06-1667, 2006 WL 2726281.
6 See El-Masri, 479 F.3d 296. See also Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004).
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rendition cases may also have broader applicability in other areas
where the state secrets privilege is frequently asserted.7
I will first discuss what I believe are the current points of
dispute surrounding the privilege. These points of dispute concern
the origins of the privilege, the manner in which the Bush
administration has invoked the privilege post 9/11, and which
branch of government is best suited to correct the perceived
problems with the current status of the privilege. From there I will
briefly address why I believe these points of contention, while
important, to some degree miss the more significant and pragmatic
point; if the privilege as currently formulated prevents meaningful
oversight of executive actions and does not strike a fair balance
between individual rights and the protection of legitimate state
secrets, what must be done to craft a better privilege?
In the final part of the paper, I will take on the task of
suggesting a combination of solutions which I believe will place
the state secrets privilege on better footing, so that it is not simply
used by the executive as a means of avoiding accountability for
the way it chooses to engage in extraordinary renditions.
Admittedly, these suggested solutions are tentative and I do not
offer them as either a complete and final word on the subject, or as
a silver bullet that will absolutely resolve all problems associated
with the state secrets privilege. It is my hope that these
suggestions will provoke further thought on this important issue.
I. Current Debate over the State Secrets Privilege
A. Source and Scope of the Privilege
The state secrets privilege is not new to the Bush
administration and it has been part of our judicial system in some
form since the beginning of the Republic. Rather than provide a
detailed discussion of the origin of the privilege, I will address two
of the most often cited cases relating to the state secrets privilege
7 See, e.g., Terkel v. AT&T, 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Al Odah, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 1.
8 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 143 (1803) (noting in
dicta that Attorney General Lincoln may not have had to disclose information
communicated to him in confidence); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)
(holding that the existence and terms of a contract between the President and a secret
agent were privileged from disclosure).
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to put into focus the current debate over the source of the
privilege. The first case, Totten v. United States,9 arose out of a
claim from a Union spy during the Civil War. In Totten, the
plaintiff filed a claim against the government on behalf of the
estate of William A. Lloyd. 10 The plaintiffs claimed that in 1861
Mr. Lloyd entered into an agreement with President Lincoln to spy
on the Confederacy.1' According to the plaintiff, Mr. Lloyd
agreed to travel into the southern states to ascertain the number of
Confederate troops stationed at different locations and to gather
and report other information that would be beneficial to the
Union. In return, the President agreed to pay Mr. Lloyd $200 a
month. 3
The Court of Claims found that Mr. Lloyd had only been
compensated for his expenses, but the court disagreed as to the
President's authority to enter into such an agreement and declined
the claim. 14  The Supreme Court, however, had no difficulty
deciding that the President did in fact have the authority to enter
into such agreements during war time as part of his commander-
in-chief authority.' 5 The Court focused on the very nature of such
a secret agreement between the government and a secret agent. By
its terms, both parties "must have understood that the lips of the
other were to be for ever sealed respecting the relation of either to
the matter."' 6 According to the Court, the revelation of such an
agreement could compromise or embarrass the government in its
public duties.' 7  In essence, the Court concluded that if a secret
service was required to address and litigate claims such as these
and to subject these agreements to public exposure, the
government could not perform important and necessary functions.
For public policy reasons, the Court rejected the Lloyd estate's
claim against the government and in so doing recognized a type of
9 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
10 Id. at 105.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 105-06.
13 Id. at 106.
14 Id.
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state secrets privilege.' 8
The current incarnation of the state secrets privilege derives
from the Cold War era case of United States v. Reynolds.19 In
Reynolds, the families of three civilians brought suit against the
government under the Tort Claims Act for the deaths of their
spouses in the crash of a B-29 military aircraft.20 The aircraft had
been testing secret electronic equipment when a fire broke out
during the flight killing three of the four civilians on board.2'
The plaintiffs sought production of the accident investigation
report compiled by the Air Force as well as the statements of three
22surviving crew members. The government resisted the release of
this information, citing both Air Force regulations and the need to
protect highly secret military equipment and national security.
2 3
When ordered by the District Court to produce the documents for
the court's determination of the existence of privileged material,
the government refused and a judgment of negligence was entered
in favor of the plaintiffs.24
The government appealed and received more favorable
consideration by the Supreme Court. At the outset the Court said
it was unwilling to decide the case on broad constitutional issues
of executive department power or whether the Tort Claims Act
represents a waiver of that power.25 Instead, the Court focused on
what it felt was a much narrower basis, the evidentiary laws of
privilege.26 The Court said that, in essence, the government was
claiming a state secrets privilege, which according to the Court
was a well established privilege under the law of evidence.
27
Even though judicial experience with the state secrets privilege
was limited, the Court was able to discern its parameters. The
privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by the
18 Id. at 107.
19 U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
20 Id. at 2-3.
21 Id. at 2.
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id. at 3-4.
24 Id. at 5.
25 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6.
26 Id. at 6-7.
27 Id.
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head of the department which has control over the matter after the
department head has personally considered the matter.2 8  In
addition, the privilege should not be lightly invoked and the court
in which the proceeding is being held has the ultimate authority as
to whether the privilege exists.29  This aspect of the Court's
opinion is straightforward and relatively unremarkable.
The Court went on to note that the real challenge for any
tribunal is to properly assess whether the privilege exists without
at the same time risking the very disclosure of the information
sought to be protected. 30 To address this balancing of interests,
the Court drew an analogy to a witness's privilege against self
incrimination. 31 The Court noted that, as with the privilege against
self incrimination, some formula of compromise should be
developed and applied in the state secrets context. 32 The Court
reasoned that the government should not automatically be required
to disclose information ex parte and in camera even to the judge
who is making the privilege assessment.33 In cases where there is
a reasonable danger that disclosure of the evidence will expose
military matters which in the interests of national security should
not be disclosed, the tribunal should not require the examination of
the protected material, even by a judge alone, in chambers. 34
Applying that formula, the Court held that the government
should not have been required to disclose this information to the
judge because under the circumstances there was a reasonable
possibility that military secrets were involved and a sufficient
showing of privilege had been made by the government.35 The
Court also stated that a showing of necessity should help to
determine how deeply a tribunal should probe in determining the
claim of privilege.3 The greater the need for the information, the
28 Id. at 7-8.
29 Id. at 7-9.
30 Id. at 8.
31 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8-9.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 10.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 10-11.
36 Id. at 11.
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more the court should probe to determine if a privilege exists.37 In
contrast, if there are substitutes to this information from other
sources, less probing is required. 38 The Court was also careful to
say that no degree of necessity would trump a legitimate claim of
privilege. 39  This is the state secrets privilege that is currently
applied by the courts the disagreement over the source and the
scope of the privilege stems from this case.
Some contend that, because the state secrets privilege was
created by the courts and specifically by the Supreme Court in
Totten and Reynolds, it is primarily a common law privilege.4 °
This common law origin is important to those who assert that
since the courts created the privilege, courts have the power to
41
modify or change the privilege as needed in a particular case.
Additionally, because the privilege is a common law creation,
Congress has the authority to codify the privilege by statute and in
so doing, it can place limits on the executive's ability to assert and
rely on the privilege.
42
Not everyone, however, sees the state secrets privilege as a
court-created doctrine. The very context in which the privilege is
asserted to protect military secrets and national security interests
suggests that the privilege stems from the president's Article II
powers as commanderin-chief43 and from his authority to conduct
foreign relations on behalf of the United States.44 Even the
Reynolds Court suggests in a footnote that the executive's power
to suppress documents has its roots in such executive power.
4 5
Many who believe that the source for the state secrets privilege is
37 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
38 Id. It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a detailed criticism of the
Reynolds opinion. Rather, this opinion is discussed in order to understand the origins of
the privilege as it currently exists.
39 Id.
40 See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged Executive: Why the Judiciary
Can (and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=986401.
41 See id.
42 See Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007); see Telman, supra note 40.
43 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
44 United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
45 U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 n.9 (1953).
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the executive's inherent powers under the Constitution contend
that neither the Congress nor the courts have the competence or
the constitutional authority to modify, change or ignore the
privilege.46 Some argue, accordingly, that the privilege is absolute
and can be exercised at the sole discretion of the executive who is
in the best position to know when disclosure of protected
information would have an adverse impact on national security
interests.47
B. The Bush Administration's Employment of the Privilege
The second area of debate surrounding the state secrets
privilege concerns how the Bush administration has asserted the
privilege. Those critical of the President claim that his
administration is asserting the privilege much more frequently
than his predecessors. 48 Some critics also contend that the Bush
administration has asserted the privilege in a way that is
qualitatively different from how the privilege was used by past
administrations.
4 9
Those who contend that the Bush administration used the
privilege much more frequently point to the number of times and
the broad spectrum of cases where the privilege is being
asserted.50 They note for example, that between 1953, when the
Court recognized the privilege, and 1976, the privilege was
asserted somewhere between four and eleven times. 1 In the next
25 years there were a total of between fifty-one and fifty-nine
reported cases where courts ruled on the privilege. 52 These critics
assert that the post 9/11 Bush administration has "expand[ed] the
privilege to cover a wide variety of contexts" and that the
46 See, e.g., John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 573, 590-591 (2006).
47 See id. at 590-600.
48 See William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive
Power, 120 POL. Sci. Q. 85 (2005); see Frost, supra note 42; see Telman, supra note 40.
49 See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 49.
50 Id. at 101.
51 Id.; see also Frost, supra note 42, at 1938; see also Shayana Kadidal, The State
Secrets Privilege and Executive Misconduct, JURIST Forum, May 30, 2006, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/05/state-secrets-privilege-and-executive.php.
52 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 48, at 101; Frost, supra note 42, at 1938.
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administration is asserting the privilege much more often. 53
Closely related to this increased quantitative use of the
privilege is the assertion that the Bush administration has used the
privilege in a qualitatively different and much more sweeping
manner then its predecessors.54 Specifically, some critics claim
that the administration has asserted the privilege at a much earlier,
pre-discovery stage of the trial process.5 5 Rather then attempting
to limit discovery, the administration sought to aggressively
dismiss the entire complaint.56
Behind both of these criticisms is the fear or belief that the
Bush administration asserted the privilege not to protect legitimate
state secrets, but to protect members of the administration from
accountability for the illegal manner in which it has conducted the
war on terror. 57 This suspicion stems from the obvious point that
there is an inherent conflict of interest in giving the administration
the authority to decide for itself what information should be
protected and what information should be released.58
Professor Robert Chesney has provided a very thoughtful
counter-argument to claims that the Bush administration has used
the state secrets privilege in a quantitatively and qualitatively
different manner than past presidents.59  Professor Chesney
presents exhaustive research of both pre and post 9/11 cases and
concludes that the data does not support the conclusion that the
Bush administration has resorted to the use of the privilege with
greater frequency than prior administrations. 60  As to the
qualitative use of the privilege, Professor Chesney concludes that
the government has been seeking outright dismissal of complaints
on state secrets grounds with considerable success since the
53 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 48, at 107-08; see Frost, supra note 42, at 1938;
see also Kadidal, supra note 51.
54 Kadidal, supra note 51.
55 Id.
56 Frost, supra note 42, at 193940.
57 Kadidal, supra note 51.
58 Telman, supra note 40, at 12-13; Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 48, at 107.
59 Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1249 (2007).
60 Id. at 1301.
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1970s.61
C. Who Should Check the Executive's Assertion of the
Privilege?
For those who either believe that the administration has
abused the state secrets privilege or at least believe that the current
application of the privilege by the courts is ineffectual, an
additional area of debate exists. The question for these critics is:
who is better suited to check the executive's unwarranted assertion
of power via the privilege?
Some contend that any reforms to the state secrets privilege as
well as oversight of the executive's actions must come from
Congress. 62 The history of the state secrets privilege proves that
courts are simply incapable or unwilling to apply the privilege in
any way that would strike an appropriate balance between the
interests of the state and the rights of the individual.63 Congress,
on the other hand, through the combined use of legislation and
oversight, is the branch best suited to check the executive's
power. 64
Others of course take the opposite view.6 5  While Congress
may have the authority to check the executive's assertion of power
through the state secrets privilege, it will not act for a number of
61 Id. at 1307.
62 See, e.g. Victor Hansen & Lawrence Friedman, The Case Against Secret
Evidence, 12 RoGER WILLLIAMS U. L. REV. 772 (2007) (arguing that Congress has
Constitutional responsibility to serve as a check on executive power in war time);
Kenneth Anderson, It's Congress's War Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 3, 2006 § 6 (Magazine) at
20 (arguing that responsibility for democratically establishing policy in the war on terror
falls to the legislative branch).
63 Disclosure of Classified Information to Congress: Hearing Before the Select
Comm. On Intelligence, 105th Cong. 54 (1998) (statement of Louis Fisher).
64 See e.g., Chesney, supra note 59, at 1311-13 (arguing for members of
congressional intelligence committees to serve as advisors to Article III courts on
specific cases and for the creation of a FISC type court to hear cases that have been
dismissed by federal courts). Even many of those who see a role for the courts have
suggested that Congress take a more active role in legislation and oversight. See e.g.,
Frost, supra note 42, at 1958-61 (suggesting that instead of dismissing cases where the
state secrets privilege is successfully invoked, courts should refer cases back to Congress
for specific oversight).
65 See, e.g. Telman, supra note 40.
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reasons. First, it is doubtful that any statutory solution developed
by Congress could be flexible enough and yet clear enough to be
applied in all the various contexts in which the state secrets
privilege arises. 66 There is also the belief that Congress lacks the
political will, particularly in war time, to conduct meaningful
oversight. 67 This coupled with the fact that, when oversight is
conducted, it is often done behind closed doors, where members
have no ability to share information, make effective oversight
impossible. 68  These critics suggest that the courts must craft
flexible and workable solutions in individual cases. 69
II. Why this Debate Misses the Mark
These three topics have garnered much of the attention in the
current debate and discussion of the state secrets privilege. To be
sure, each of these topics is important for many reasons, not the
least of which is that one's position on these various issues tends
to determine how one feels about the need to reform the state
secrets privilege and what form that might take. Nonetheless,
focusing too much on these issues, which are never likely to be
resolved to everyone's satisfaction, can detract from the real task
at hand, which is to ensure a workable and fair formulation of the
state secrets privilege.
On the question of whether the privilege is of common law
origin or stems from the executive's inherent Article II powers, I
have concluded, as have others,7 ° that the answer is a little bit of
both. The best analogy to explain the source and scope of the
privilege is that the privilege has an inalterable constitutional core
surrounded by a revisable common law shell that has developed
over time.71 Of course, this analogy does not answer the more
vexing question of where the line is between the constitutional
core and the common law shell. The difficulty, if not the
impossibility, of drawing an exact line, however, does not give the
66 Id. at 16.
67 See, e.g., id. at 19; Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending
Powers, 43 ST. Loiis U. L. J. 931 (1999).
68 Telman, supra note 40, at 18-19.
69 See, e.g., id.; see also Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 48.
70 See, e.g. Chesney, supra note 59, at 1309-10.
71 Id.
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executive authority to assert the privilege at its complete and
unfettered discretion. Nor does it give Congress and the courts a
justification to stand on the sidelines as passive observers.
As with most aspects of our constitutional framework of
checks and balances, clear delineation of responsibilities and exact
line drawing between the three branches of government is not
found in either the text or the history of the Constitution.72 The
extent and scope of the state secrets privilege relies to an extent on
the forbearance of each branch of government to act only within
its scope. With that forbearance comes the understanding that,
when one branch of government pushes too far, the natural and
expected consequence should be that the other branches will push
back. Rather than focusing too much, then, on where the line
exists between the executive, Congress, and the courts as to the
source and scope of the state secrets privilege, I believe it is more
important to understand that if the scope of the privilege is
undefined as to executive, it is likewise undefined as to Congress
and the courts. This fluidity gives Congress and the courts the
ability and responsibility to push back when each determines that
the executive has pushed too far.
On the second area of debate, whether the Bush
administration asserted the privilege in a way quantitatively and
qualitatively different from its predecessors, here too, the debate is
not as important as the underlying issue. Perhaps the
administration asserted the privilege in a way that was historically
different. Perhaps the administration's use of the privilege in the
post 9/11 world was a natural evolution of the privilege and the
Bush administration was merely standing on the shoulders of past
administrations. Or, perhaps it is a combination of the times we
are in and the threats we face as a country that explains why the
Bush administration is actively asserting the privilege in
extraordinary renditions and other cases. Any one of these
explanations, or a combination of these explanations along with
others, does not, however, get at the core issue, which is whether
the state secrets privilege in its current formulation appropriately
balances competing interests and provides sufficient guidance to
courts tasked with resolving these issues.
An argument can be made that the current formulation of the
72 See Hansen & Friedman, supra note 62.
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privilege was flawed from its inception.73 A state secrets privilege
that allows the executive to prevent even the court from reviewing
the disputed information ex parte and in camera comes with a
significant risk that the executive's rationale for asserting the
privilege will have less to do with protecting national security and
more to do with the executive's desire to avoid accountability.
Even in the Reynolds case itself, Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) petitions filed years later revealed that the excluded
evidence did not contain classified information.74 Rather, the
accident report contained information pointing to the
government's negligence. 75  The critical point is not so much
whether the Bush administration used the privilege in some new
way. Rather, the focus should be on whether the privilege is so
flawed and so open for abuse that it needs to be changed.
This point leads to the third area of dispute, whether Congress
or the courts are better suited to change or "fix" the privilege, so
that it better serves its intended purposes. As with the other current
areas of dispute, this debate risks missing the mark. If the
executive is in fact using the privilege to avoid accountability, and
if the current formulation allows the executive to do this, both
Congress and the courts should check the administration's
unjustified assertion of power.
The time has come, I believe, for Congress to codify the
privilege as a formal rule of evidence, to provide a more clearly
defined structure for courts to apply. This goes back to the very
rationale for codifying the federal rules of evidence more than
thirty years ago. When the federal rules were initially proposed,
they included an entire section on privileges including proposed
rule of evidence 509, titled "Secrets of State and other Official
Informatio" 7 6
Congress rejected the advisory committee's attempt to codify
this and other privileges, and in its place adopted a rule that
reserved for Congress the right to codify privileges by statute in
73 Chesney, supra note 59, at 1287-88.
74 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 48, at 99.
75 Id.
76 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Revised Proposed Draft 1973), 56 F.R.D. 183, 251 (1973).
This proposed rule, in large part, was a codification of the state secrets privilege
established by the Reynolds court.
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the future. 77 In the absence of constitutional or statutory authority,
federal courts are to be governed by common law privileges.
Congress's primary rationale for rejecting specific rules of
privilege focused on how state privilege rules would be applied in
diversity cases and other suits where state substantive law is the
object of the evidence.79 The House and Senate committees also
believed that there was no compelling federal interest in codifying
privileges and those privileges should continue to be developed by
the courts with a uniform standard applicable to both criminal and
civil cases.
80
More than thirty years later, the rationale that kept Congress
from codifying a state secrets privilege no longer applies. First,
there is quite clearly an important federal interest in codifying the
state secrets privilege to agencies of the federal government. Such
a codification would resolve issues as to whether the federal law
of privileges should apply or whether some state form of the
privilege should apply via rule of evidence 501.
More importantly, codification of the rule would provide
courts greater and more uniform guidance than is currently
provided under the common law rule announced in Reynolds.
Codification would lead to clearer guidance for federal agencies as
well, and ensure a more uniform application of the rules across the
circuits, diminishing the risk of forum shopping by either plaintiffs
or the government.
Most importantly, codification of the rule has at least the
potential to better serve as a check against the executive's
assertion of the privilege as a means of avoiding accountability.
The privilege is an evidentiary privilege and was never intended to
equate to executive immunity. Codification of the rule, with a
clearer delineation of the operations and application of the
privilege, would serve as a legitimate check on executive power.
Additionally, one of the stated reasons for not codifying the
privilege rules was to ensure the development of a uniform
77 FED. R. EVID. 501.
78 Id.
79 FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note.
80 Id.
81 U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 n.21 (1953).
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standard applicable in both civil and criminal trials.82 As it stands
now, no uniform standard exists. In 1980, Congress passed the
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 83 to address
assertions of the state secrets privilege in federal criminal cases.
This statute provides a very detailed set of procedures on how to
deal with classified information in criminal trials. The provisions
of CIPA stand in sharp contrast to the Reynolds version of the
privilege in civil cases. We do not in fact have uniform
development of the state secrets privilege and for that reason as
well, it is time for Congress to act.
In short, codification of the privilege is needed to provide
uniformity and guidance to the courts, which have the
responsibility of assessing the privilege in individual cases.
Courts then should be expected to implement the privilege in a
way that gives individual litigants the opportunity to pursue
remedies through the judicial system whenever possible, while
still protecting legitimate state secrets. The executive should also
be expected to shoulder some of the costs of asserting the privilege
and protecting state secrets when it is done at the expense of
individual litigants. And most importantly, the privilege should
not immunize the executive from appropriate oversight by
Congress and the courts.
III.Proposed Solution
In this final section, I will set out what I believe is the most
effective and pragmatic codification of the state secrets privilege.
This codification should seek to achieve several objectives. First,
the privilege should allow for meaningful oversight of executive
actions. Second, to the greatest degree possible individuals should
have the opportunity to use the judicial system as a means of
pursuing their claims. Third, the privilege must protect legitimate
state secrets. Fourth, the privilege should be structured to protect
the government from baseless lawsuits. Finally, even in cases
where the government correctly claims the state secrets privilege,
the burdens of that consequence should not be bom solely by the
individual. The government itself must shoulder some of the costs
82 FED R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note.
83 Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025
(1980). A more complete discussion of CIPA follows in the next section of the paper.
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of asserting the privilege. The solution that I propose below is an
attempt to achieve these ends.
A. CIPA as a Guide
Fortunately, Congress has already grappled with many of
these issues in the criminal context with the passage of CIPA in
1980, which provides helpful guidance in crafting a state secrets
privilege for civil cases. 84  CIPA was designed to address the
problem of "graymail," where a criminal defendant threatens to
disclose classified information at trial in hopes of forcing the
government to dismiss the case rather than risk disclosure.85 CIPA
was also enacted to manage the tension between a criminal
defendant's right to discover classified information and introduce
that information at trial and the government's legitimate interest in
preventing the disclosure of information related to national
security.
CIPA establishes a standard for when information will be
discoverable and admissible at trial.87 For discovery purposes, the
defendant must show that the information is material to the
defense. 88 If the defense later seeks to introduce that evidence at
trial, it must establish that the information is useful, relevant and
admissible. 89  If the defense makes the required showing, the
government is given the option to either disclose the information
or request a modification or substitution of the information
requested. 90 At trial, rather than disclosing the information, the
government has the option of admitting the relevant facts that the
classified information would tend to prove, or substituting a
summary of the information in a non-classified form. 9' If these
84 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed explanation of CIPA.
Please note that what follows is a general outline of CIPA's basic provisions.
85 Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1962, 1964
(2005).
86 United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 578 (7th Cir. 2005).
87 Classified Information Procedures Act, supra note 84.
88 United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2006); United States v.
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the District Court must determine
whether the information the Government seeks to withhold is material to the defense).
89 Classified Information Procedures Act, supra note 83, §§ 2-6.
90 Id. § 4.
91 Id. § 6(c). See also Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476 (discussing procedure once the
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substitutes will not provide the defendant with substantially the
same ability to make his defense, the government can elect
between disclosing the information and dismissing the charge.
92
In addition to these provisions, CIPA provides the government
with the ability to seek an interlocutory appeal of a court ordered
disclosure. 93 CIPA also gives the government and the court broad
authority to close trial proceedings to the public in order to protect
classified information.
Congress should adopt a similar privilege in the civil context.
There are those who would argue that a CIPA-like privilege is not
applicable in the civil context because different interests are
involved.95  In the criminal context, the government has the
ultimate control of the case and can decide not to bring a criminal
action if the potential harm to national security that would result in
the disclosure of evidence is too high.96 If the government
chooses to bring an action, it has the duty to see that justice is
done and cannot use the state secrets privilege to deprive the
defendant of evidence that may be material to his defense.97 The
Court in Reynolds noted that this rationale does not apply in a civil
case, where the government is not the moving party.
While it may be true that the same interests are not at stake in
the civil context where the government is not the moving party, it
is short sighted to assume that no similar issues are at sake. The
government's use of extraordinary renditions serves to illustrate
the similarity of these interests. The government has made the
decision that this rendition program is a necessary tool in the
global war on terrorism. The President himself has defended a
program that allows suspected terrorists to be snatched from any
place in the world and transported and interrogated at secret "black
sites" as an essential intelligence gathering aspect of this war.
99
District Court determines an item of classified information is relevant and material).
92 Classified Information Procedures Act, supra note 83, §§ 6(c), 6(e).
93 Id. § 7.
94 Id. § 6(a).
95 Id.
96 U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99See President George W. Bush, Speech in Defense of Detainee Program (Sep. 6, 2006)
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As with a criminal prosecution, in the case of the
extraordinary renditions program, ultimately the government is in
control. Just as the government must bear some of the costs if it
decides to proceed with a criminal prosecution that involves
classified evidence, so too the government should bear some of the
costs for operating an extraordinary renditions program which can
potentially snag someone like Khaled El-Masri in its net. Just as
the rights of a criminal defendant are important and must be
protected from government overreaching, so too must the rights of
someone like El-Masri be protected from illegal and erroneous
government actions. To simply conclude that there are no similar
interests in civil and criminal cases because the government is the
defendant in a civil action gives too much deference to
government interests at the expense of the individual, and it
conflicts with the need to ensure government accountability and
respect for the rule of law.
B. ABA Proposal
The American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights
and Responsibilities has recognized the important interests at stake
in the civil context and has proposed the outline of a privilege that
has much in common with CIPA.1°° This proposed outline goes a
long way in achieving the important goals of a pragmatic and
effective state secrets privilege, and Congress should consider the
ABA's proposal carefully. Some key points of this proposal
warrant discussion.
The proposal would allow the government "to plead the
privilege in its answer to particular allegations . . . without
admitting or denying those allegations and no adverse inference
could be drawn against the government for doing so." 10 1  In
addition, the government would be required to provide a "full and
complete explanation of its privilege claim" and make the
(video available at
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/politics/2006/09/06/sot.bush.gitmo.detainees.cnn).
100 Robert E. Stein, Rep. to the House of Delegates: Recommendation, 2007 A.B.A.
Sec. of Individual Rights and Responsibilities [hereinafter Recommendation], available
at http://fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/aba081307.pdf. The full text of this recommendation is
at appendix A.
101 Recommendation at a, app. at 1.
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evidence at issue available for an in camera review by the court.10 2
This is an important departure from the current Reynolds practice
which permits the government to assert the privilege without
disclosing the evidence at issue for judicial review. 10 3 This change
will help ensure a more fair evaluation of the privilege and help
prevent the government from asserting the privilege merely as a
way to avoid accountability. Courts evaluating the state secrets
privilege in criminal cases have proven to be capable of
adequately protecting national security interests while conducting
this review and there is no reason to believe that they would not be
as careful and competent in the civil context. History has shown
over the past fifty years that the extreme caution under the
Reynolds system is not warranted and the Reynolds case itself
shows just how easy it is for the government to skirt accountability
by refusing to even provide the evidence to the court for an in
camera review.
Next, in order to prevent the assertion of the privilege from
stopping litigation even before discovery is conducted, the ABA
proposal "[p]ermits the discovery of non-privileged evidence that
may tend to prove the plaintiffs claim or the defendant's defense"
if that evidence can be "segregated from privileged evidence."' 10 4
In addition, any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based
on the state secrets privilege would "be deferred until the parties
complete discovery of the facts relevant to the motion and the
court resolves any privilege claims."' 0 5 These proposals represent
a significant improvement over the current practice and provide
the plaintiff at least some opportunity to make a case. If Congress
adopts this proposal, courts will have adequate tools to allow cases
to proceed through the discovery phase while still protecting
national security interests.
In addition, the ABA proposal includes a number of CIPA-
like provisions which require the government, whenever possible,
to either produce non-privileged substitutes for privileged
evidence or admit the relevant facts if that evidence is essential to
102 Id. at b, app. at 1.
103 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
104 Recommendation at d, app. at 1.
105 Id. at f, app. at 2.
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prove a claim or defense in the case.' ° 6 Once the court takes all of
these steps and reviews proffered evidence by the parties, the court
will not enter a judgment for the government based on the state
secrets privilege if the plaintiff is able to prove a prima facie case
with non-privileged evidence unless the government's ability to
defend against the plaintiff would be substantially impaired
because of the defendant's need to present specific privileged
information.10 7  The benefit of this provision is that it better
reflects the need to keep the courts open and available to plaintiffs
who may have a legitimate claim against the government and
permits them to make their case based on non-privileged
evidence.108 By requiring the plaintiff to make a prima facie
showing, this provision also helps to weed out baseless claims and
it serves to prevent the kind of "graymail" issue which CIPA also
addresses in the criminal context.
There are two areas where I believe the ABA proposal does
not go far enough. One relates to the standard for requiring
alternatives to the privileged evidence. The second deals with the
consequences to the plaintiff when the government successfully
asserts the privilege and the litigation is dismissed. The standard
suggested in the ABA proposal for requiring the government to
provide some alternative to the privileged evidence is "a substitute
that provides a substantially equivalent opportunity to litigate the
claim or defense as would the privileged evidence." 0 9 This
standard is more favorable to the government than the standard for
requiring alternative evidence under CIPA. The CIPA standard is
"substantially the same ability to make his defense as would
disclosure of the specified information." 110  "Substantially
equivalent opportunity to litigate" is similar but it is not the same
as "substantially the same ability." The CIPA standard recognizes
the fact that the substitute evidence should be of the same
evidentiary quality as the privileged information. This higher
standard reduces the risk that the government will attempt to
substitute evidence of a lesser evidentiary quality than the
106 Id. at e, app. at 1-2.
107 Id. at g, app. at 2.
108 Id.
109 Id. at e(ii), app. at 1.
110 Classified Information Procedures Act, supra note 83, § 6(c).
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privileged information. Adopting the same standard also
recognizes that the interests protected by CIPA are similar to the
interests protected by a CIPA-like rule in the civil context.
C. Consequences for Successful Invocation of the Privilege
In the criminal context CIPA is very clear that if the classified
evidence is useful, relevant, and admissible, and a substitute for
the classified evidence is not appropriate, the government must
elect between disclosing the evidence or dismissing the case."'
While a similar option could be crafted in the civil context, few
have suggested this approach. Still the question remains what to
do in the situation where the plaintiff cannot proceed with the
claim because the court has determined under this CIPA-like
process that the government has a legitimate state secrets
privilege. I suggest that in these situations a type of claims
compensation fund could be created and administered by the
appropriate government agency as a means for providing an
opportunity for some compensation for legitimate cases while still
protecting state secrets. My proposal is focused on a claimant like
Khaled El-Masri, who alleged that he was subjected to illegal
treatment by government agents and contractors and that he was
mistakenly captured and detained in the administration's
extraordinary renditions program. However, similar compensation
funds could be created in other contexts where the government
successfully asserts the state secrets privilege.
Taking El-Masri as an example, assume that his case is
dismissed because he was unable to make a prima facia case
without reliance on privileged evidence and no adequate
substitutes are available. If the court dismisses his case on that
ground, he would then have the opportunity to present his case to
the agency that administers the renditions program, likely the
Central Intelligence Agency. As a condition for submitting his
claim, he would agree to non-disclosure provisions that would
preclude him from disclosing the claim or any potential settlement.
The claim would then be evaluated by members of the agency
with the appropriate security clearances and knowledge of and
access to the relevant information. These agency representatives
would have the authority and responsibility of evaluating the
IlI Id. §§ 6(c), 6(e)
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claims and providing compensation where appropriate. The
obvious concern with a program such as this is whether the agency
could be trusted to fairly evaluate the conduct and actions of its
own personnel. In this case, there could be a strong tendency to
deny claims, particularly since the claimant has no recourse to the
courts that have already dismissed the claim on state secrets
grounds.
There is, however, significant precedent for these kinds of
programs in the military context and they have a long history of
successful and fair adjudications. Take, for example, the United
States Army Claims Program. This program is operated under
statutory and regulatory authority and is designed to adjudicate
and pay claims to claimants who allege such things as medical
malpractice, property damage and similar claims alleging
negligence of Army personnel. 1 2  Under the Army Claims
Program, military and civilian officials within the Department of
Defense investigate and adjudicate claims and pay claimants when
appropriate." 13 This program alleviates the need for litigation in
appropriate cases. 14
There is no reason to think that other government agencies
that are required to follow statutory and regulatory guidance
would be any less capable of evaluating claims that have been
dismissed because of the successful invocation of the state secrets
privilege. The likely number of cases in the renditions context
would be fairly small and would not represent a significant
administrative burden on the agency. Because cases would only
be potentially eligible for the compensation fund after they have
been dismissed from an Article III court due to the successful
invocation of the state secrets privilege, that process would
prevent a government agency from being flooded with baseless
claims.
Such a program would allow a claimant some compensation
when the courts are closed to his case because of the state secrets
privilege. In addition, the government agency, and ultimately the
executive, would be required to bear some of the costs for
establishing and running an extraordinary renditions program. As
112 Purpose of the Army Claims System, 32 C.F.R. §536.1, §536.2 (2007).
113 Id. § 536.3.
114 Id. § 536.1.
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it stands now, if the executive successfully asserts the state secrets
privilege, it bears none of the costs for any illegal, wrongful or
mistaken conduct. Placing some of the costs back on the
executive would have the added benefit of encouraging the
executive to conform its conduct to relevant legal requirements.
In addition, this compensation fund program would provide one
more layer of oversight into the executive's conduct. Congress
would be responsible for appropriating the necessary funding for
the compensation fund and as part of its oversight function,
Congress could require the funded agency to provide periodic
reporting on how the fund is being administered. This process
gives Congress an additional tool to ensure executive
accountability while still protecting privileged information.
D. Benefits of Proposed Changes
Taken together, there are a number of benefits for codifying
the state secrets privilege along the lines of CIPA and establishing
some type of compensation fund. First, these proposals involve
both Congress and the courts. Congress codifies the privilege and
oversees the administration of a compensation fund. The courts
are responsible for determining when the state secrets privilege is
properly invoked and they are able to do so with greater access to
information and more guidance from Congress. Involving both
Congress and the courts is necessary to provide an effective check
on possible excesses by the executive.There are added benefits to a state secrets privilege codified
along the lines of CIPA. CIPA has a proven history of effectively
balancing the interests of the individual against the need to protect
national security. This codification achieves the added benefit of
bringing the rules of evidence in criminal and civil cases more in
line with each other, an important goal of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. These proposed changes are also sufficiently robust to
deter frivolous litigation and the threat of "graymail" in the civil
context.
This codified privilege also ensures greater opportunity for
individual litigants to have access to the courts to address
governmental abuses. In those cases where the state secrets
privilege does prevent the case from going forward, claimants still
have an opportunity for compensation under the compensation
fund program administered by the appropriate agency.
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In achieving all of these objectives, legitimate national
security interests are still protected. The executive is not
prevented from claiming state secrets in the appropriate case.
With these proposed changes, the executive must bear some of the
cost of asserting the privilege. More importantly, the executive is
now subjected to oversight from both Congress and the courts,
thus ensuring that the state secrets privilege does not become
synonymous with executive immunity.
IV. Conclusion
In fighting the war on terror, the Bush administration has
operated a number of programs which it believed necessary to
successfully prosecute the war. One of the most controversial of
these programs is the use of extraordinary renditions as a means of
capturing and interrogating people suspected of being involved in
terrorism. To date, the administration has successfully prevented
the courts from litigating claims involving these programs by
asserting the state secrets privilege.
The debate is likely to continue over the origins of the state
secrets privilege, the manner in which the Bush administration is
asserting the privilege, and whether Congress or the courts should
check the executive's assertion of authority. While these debates
are useful in illuminating important issues surrounding the
privilege, to some degree, each of these debates misses the more
critical question: if the state secrets privilege established in
Reynolds fails to strike the appropriate balance, what must be done
to correct the problem?
I believe there is a role for both the Congress and the courts in
this process. Congress has proven successful in the past in
codifying a state secrets privilege in the criminal context and
courts have proven very capable of applying that privilege in
individual cases. A CIPA-like statute is warranted in the civil
context and the ABA proposal serves as a very helpful guideline.
In addition, a claims compensation fund overseen by Congress and
administered by the appropriate executive agency will help ensure
that individuals have an opportunity to assert their claims when the
courts are unable to adjudicate their lawsuits. This process will
ensure that the executive bears some of the costs for its conduct
and it provides for greater Congressional and judicial oversight,
while still protecting legitimate national security interests.
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Appendix A
REVISED REPORT 116A
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports
procedures and standards designed to ensure that whenever
possible, federal civil cases are not dismissed based solely on the
state secrets privilege; and 4 FURTHER RESOLVED, That, in
furtherance of this objective the American Bar Association urges
Congress to enact legislation governing federal civil cases
implicating the state secrets privilege (including cases in which the
government is an original party or an intervenor) that:
a. Permits the government to plead the privilege in its answer
to particular allegations in the complaint without admitting or
denying those allegations, and draw no adverse inferences against
the government for doing so;
b. Requires the government to provide a full and complete
explanation of its privilege claim and to make available for in
camera review the evidence the government claims is subject to
the privilege;
c. Requires a judicial assessment of the legitimacy of the
government's privilege claims and deems privileged only evidence
disclosure of which the court finds is reasonably likely to be
significantly detrimental or injurious to the national defense or to
cause substantial injury to the diplomatic relations of the United
States;
d. Permits the discovery of non-privileged evidence that may
tend to prove the plaintiffs claim or the defendant's defense,
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provided that such evidence can be effectively segregated from
privileged evidence, and where appropriate, provides for
protective orders, in camera hearings, special masters to assist
(including when the claim of privilege involves voluminous
records), or other measures where necessary to protect the
government's legitimate national security interests;
e. Requires the government to produce a non-privileged
substitute for privileged evidence, consisting of a summary of the
privileged evidence, a version of the evidence with privileged
information redacted, or a statement admitting relevant facts that
the privileged evidence would tend to prove, provided that:
(i) The evidence is essential to prove a claim or defense in the
case;
(ii) The court finds that it is possible, without revealing
privileged evidence, for the government to produce a substitute
that provides a substantially equivalent opportunity to litigate the
claim or defense as would the privileged evidence; and
(iii) In cases in which the government is a party asserting 34 a
claim or defense that implicates the privilege, the government is
given the opportunity to elect between producing the non-
privileged substitute and conceding the claim or defense to which
the privileged evidence pertains;
f. Provides that a ruling on a motion to dismiss, or for
summary judgment, based on the state secrets privilege be
deferred until the parties complete discovery of facts relevant to
the motion and the court resolves any privilege claims asserted as
to those facts under the procedures described above;
g. Provides that, after the court takes these steps and reviews
evidence proffered by both parties, judgment for the defendant
based on the state secrets privilege is denied if the court finds that
the plaintiff is able to prove a prima facie case with non-privileged
evidence (including non-privileged evidence from sources outside
the U.S. government), unless the court also finds, following in
camera review, that the defendant's ability to defend against the
plaintiffs case would be substantially impaired because the
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defendant is unable to present specific privileged evidence; and
h. Entitles the government to take an expedited interlocutory
appeal from a district court decision authorizing the disclosure of
evidence subject to a claim under the state secrets privilege,
imposing sanctions for nondisclosure of such evidence, or refusing
a protective order to prevent disclosure of such evidence.
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